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Introduction 
 
he global intellectual property regime is no longer fit for purpose. As the networked, 
digital age matures, it puts into the hands of millions of citizens the tools to access 
create and share “content”: text, pictures, music and video; data, news, analysis and 
art. Against this, the intellectual property regime falters. It presents citizens with a choice: 
stop using the technology – stop communicating, stop creating – or break the law. 
Legal reform is presented with 
two separate challenges. The first 
is a small but vocal minority of 
entrenched corporate interests – 
the rightsholder lobby. Wedded 
to business models that pre-date 
the age of networked digital 
technology, they exploit their 
position as incumbents to 
influence legislators. Often 
representing the world’s biggest 
multinational corporations, they 
hijack a narrative that belongs to 
poor artists struggling in garrets 
and use the considerable profits 
they have made from exploiting 
these artists in the twentieth 
century to access the corridors of 
power and make their case. 
That legislators listen is related to 
a second, geopolitical, challenge. 
Since the 1970s, the developed 
world has sought to use the global 
intellectual property regime to 
ensure its continued prosperity. 
Motivated by the ability of 
developing countries to undercut 
it on the global manufacturing market, it has sought to augment the financial privilege 
afforded to “knowledge workers”. The self-interest behind this practice is masked by a 
flawed orthodoxy that is rarely backed up by evidence – that more intellectual property 
provision is always good for economic growth.  
T 
A protester outside the New Zealand Parliament in 2009 
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Against this backdrop, a global IP reform movement (also called the access to knowledge 
movement) is emerging. Motivated by a range of concerns – from global justice, to the 
narrowing spectrum of permitted speech, to the broadening of surveillance power – these 
individuals and organisations approach their campaigning work with combined levels of 
ingenuity and intellectual rigour that make them stand out in the history of fledgling civil 
rights movements. Recently, these pockets of activism have taken IP reform issues to a wide 
audience, triggering sweeping civic action in the general population. 
The goal of this report is to identify and interrogate these pockets of activism, and to draw 
lessons from them. It is hoped that these lessons spread across the broadening global 
network of IP reform activists, ensuring a strong, sustainable and ultimately successful 
global movement for IP reform well into the future. 
Becky Hogge 
May 2009 
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Lessons for IP reformers 
 
he report looked at six successful IP reform campaigns from around the world, and 
examined the strategies, messages and goals of the campaigners who fought them. 
Although each example has its own lessons to share, broad trends did emerge. 
Several of the most striking campaign successes employed the internet as a mobilising 
force. A template for such action emerges from examining these campaigns in concert. 
Almost without exception, campaigners worked in coalition with other stakeholders. These 
coalitions varied both in style and in substance, and examining those differences is 
instructive. The campaigns were fought on intellectual and emotional ground which was 
often some distance from the mechanism of intellectual property law itself. This 
observation should encourage campaigners to think about the merits and pitfalls of 
different messaging approaches, and to consider the need for a less fragmented critique of 
the current, flawed orthodoxy of the strong-IP lobby. Finally, the observation that very few 
of the case studies emerge from countries in the developing world prompts the report to 
examine why this might be so, and to challenge campaigners to examine the value of a more 
global perspective. 
Using the tools of the internet 
Fair Copyright for Canada, the two campaigns against graduated response in France and 
New Zealand, and the Open Rights Group’s campaign against copyright term extension all 
employed tools on the internet to substantial effect. Such tools include: 
 Facebook 
 e-Petitions and the mass email lists they create 
 Internet “blackouts” 
 YouTube 
 Wikis 
 IRC channels 
 Twitter 
Campaigners are keen to stress that in all cases, online mobilisation campaigns were 
coupled with more traditional lobbying activities and mainstream media work. But the use 
of online tools appeared to achieve two additional outcomes. First, they created a virtuous 
circle of mainstream media attention. Perhaps because of their novelty factor, the 
mainstream media covered the large numbers of people supporting campaigns using these 
tools, which led to increased coverage for the issue, as well as increased support for the 
online campaigns. But more importantly, they gave campaigners a pool of people whom 
they could mobilise into more traditional forms of political engagement. All campaigns that 
used these tools report that elected representatives received far higher than average 
T 
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contact from their constituents on the campaign issue. In many cases, this led to a positive 
outcome for the campaign. 
Different groups put forward different cases for the particular tools they employed. 
Facebook and other proprietary social networking platforms gave campaigners access to 
large groups of people, and allowed individual group members to quickly spread the word 
about causes across their own social networks. But building a large group on Facebook has 
the twin disadvantages that group administrators cannot message a group with more than 
5,000 members all at once, nor can group administrators contact group members outside of 
Facebook’s messaging system. E-Petitions grew less quickly, but did give campaigners 
direct access to large pools of email addresses. Internet blackout events (where 
campaigners urged those concerned by an issue to “black out” some aspect of their web 
presence, normally again on Twitter and Facebook, but also on their own websites) again 
allowed for the viral spread of a campaign message, with the added advantage of catching 
other people unawares, as they browsed through an unrelated website or checked on their 
friends on Twitter. However, this strategy also deprived campaigners of email address 
pools. 
That no one tool came out the winner in the course of the research is no bad thing. Web 
trends move quickly, and campaigners are likely to get the best results if they take 
advantage of the latest popular medium – not least to benefit from the virtuous circle of 
mainstream media coverage generated by the novelty of the technology. However, what did 
emerge was a template for grassroots mobilisation on the web. 
 Time the campaign correctly. A grassroots mobilisation campaign should start 
one or two weeks before the event on which the action is focussed (a vote, say, or 
the enactment of a law) 
 Make the message simple and accessible. It should break down into three parts: 
o a simple statement of the problem 
o an emotional or moral appeal 
o an assurance that individuals can change the situation, if they take action 
 Provide people with a graduated series of actions. Start with simple actions 
(sign this, click here and join the protest group), and provide increasingly involved 
actions: blacking out web profiles, blacking out websites;  writing letters; 
participating in consumer boycotts; turning up to protests; lobbying elected 
representatives on the phone, or face to face. 
 Channel these actions as much as possible through established political 
mechanisms. The internet is still “the other world” to most legislators, so public 
opinion should be brought to them through the established channels, like letters, 
petitions and protests. 
Some campaigners have ambitions to employ the internet to connect with established 
political channels – to in effect “close the loop” between online and offline protest 
movements. La Quadrature du Net have been building web tools that give citizens “direct 
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access” to the law-making process. They have launched a wiki called Political Memory, 
which seeks to track the voting patterns and opinions of MEPs and provide their 
constituents with ways to contact them (ultimately, they wish to provide clickable links for 
constituents to make VoIP phone calls from the site). And when writing to petition signers 
asking them to contact their MEPs, ORG sent links to the WriteToThem.com website, which 
allows UK citizens to contact their representative MEPs by email, simply by entering their 
postcode. ORG stress the need to roll out the WriteToThem service to the entire EU. 
Coalition building 
Almost all the campaigners interviewed used coalition building as a key tool to affect 
change. Given the strength of rightsholder lobbies in many of the countries where 
campaigns were fought, this is not surprising. Some campaigners also spoke of the value in 
building relationships with industry figures with interests aligned to IP reformists. 
Coalitions built varied in character along two axes – mandate and geographical location. 
Frequently, more than one type of coalition was employed in a single campaign. So, some 
coalitions, such as the one formed in the ACTA campaign in the US, featured groups from 
the same region (the US) with the same mandates (broadly, civil rights and the public 
interest). Others campaigns, such as the one against term extension, or the Fair Copyright 
for Canada campaign, or the campaign for IP reform in Brazil, featured coalitions of groups 
from the same region, but with different mandates. Coalitions of groups with the same 
mandate but from different regions also featured in the term extension campaign, as well as 
in the campaign against graduated response. No campaigns were observed where coalitions 
featured groups with different mandates from different geographical regions. 
A coalition of type A was 
observed in the United States, 
a country which drives the IP 
agenda, and which has 
arguably the most developed 
network of IP reform activists. 
Coalitions of type B (same 
region, different mandate) 
were often the result of 
broadly academic actors 
joining in coalition with activists. For the academics, the activists provided a channel 
through which their ideas and analysis could be publicised and used to affect change,  but 
which was far enough removed from their own activities so as not to compromise their 
academic reputations (in particular, for impartiality) and their access to privileged sources. 
For the activists, the academics provided them with inside contacts, expert briefs and 
substantial analysis from a reputable source all of which were of great value as they began 
to engage with legislators.  
 Same mandate Different 
mandate 
Same region A B 
Different 
region 
C n/a 
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In the campaign against copyright term extension, expert analysis was one of the key tools 
used by the Open Rights Group. However this was a curse as well as a blessing, since the 
analysis was of a highly technical nature that did not, at least not initially, play well in the 
media. Open Rights Group forged other coalitions of type B – with broadcasters, librarians, 
remix artists and public domain record labels – each of whom helped to concretise the 
problem with a copyright term extension, taking the message away from economic theory 
and more abstract ideas like 
balancing the of interests of 
consumers and creators.  
Michael Geist acted at least partly 
as an expert academic in the Fair 
Copyright for Canada campaign, 
and the organisers of the local 
Facebook groups acted as 
activists. 
In France, La Quadrature du Net 
produced their own substantive 
analysis in their fight against 
graduated response, as well as 
doing significant lobbying and 
mobilisation work. This put the 
organisation under strain – La 
Quadrature felt they would be 
quickly attacked if their analysis 
was seen to be flawed, given they 
were understood to have an 
agenda. But their lack of sufficient 
legal resources meant they often 
had to wait longer than they 
would have liked for good 
analysis. It is fair to assume that 
La Quadrature du Net would have 
benefitted from an engaged 
academic partner able to deliver 
them analysis of the many legal 
documents that came their way during their campaign. 
Coalitions of type C (same mandate, different region) studied here were coalitions of 
public interest organisations. They generally came about in response to campaigns waged 
in regional fora, such as the European Union. Both the Open Rights Group and La 
Quadrature du Net formed coalitions of type C (which in both cases included each other) to 
take their campaigns to Europe. 
Good coalition partners 
Law and economics academics. Academics can 
provide evidence, re-usable policy briefs and inside 
contacts. 
Creative Commons. Look for the legal team that 
ported CC licences to your country, but also for 
major users of CC licences. 
Free and Open Source Software advocates. 
Creators. Not all creators feel they are fairly 
represented by the information intermediaries (eg 
publishers, record labels, collecting societies) who 
claim to speak on their behalf to legislators. 
Businesses, especially internet service providers, 
web service providers and other “new” tech 
businesses. 
Librarians and Teachers. 
Other re-users of copyrighted works, such as 
film-makers, broadcasters, commercial archivists, 
re-issuers. 
Advocates for the visually impaired. 
Privacy and Free Speech campaigners. 
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Almost all of those who spoke about attitudes towards coalition-forming emphasised that 
coalitions had been achieved in a loose, informal way. Connections were based on personal 
relations, and any structures that were in place were non-hierarchical. 
Having a diverse group of stakeholders raising concerns over a particular issue is a very 
effective strategy, as it gives the impression to legislators of a groundswell of opposition. 
Forging partnerships with existing advocacy groups, for example librarians, or musicians, 
or free and open source software promoters, is a good strategy here. However, such 
advocacy groups do not exist in all countries. One campaigner who did not wish to be 
named spoke of the possibility of helping to create regional groups with different mandates 
with whom IP reform campaigners could then form coalitions. He identified a template 
methodology for establishing the formation of such groups. 
First, campaigners should identify individuals who will champion their own community – 
this is often the hardest thing to do. Once they’ve found such people, they can educate them 
on why they think IP reform issues should matter to their community, and provide them 
with resources to launch a website – a public-facing presence that will help them spread 
their message. A white paper, outlining in detail the substance of their community’s policy 
concerns should be a prominent feature of this site. Once the public-facing and policy tools 
are in place, they should then write an open letter to relevant legislators requesting an 
audience for their concerns. 
Although this might appear to be a labour-intensive process, the pay-offs in countries 
where previously debate has been captured by rightsholding industries can be significant. 
The message 
Some of the campaigns studied were fought on intellectual and emotional ground which 
was some way removed from the mechanism of intellectual property law itself. The table 
overleaf demonstrates the contrast between the baseline problem campaigns sought to 
address, and the messages they used to win support. 
Campaigns whose messages were closer to the IP mechanism included the Fair Copyright 
for Canada campaign, in its emphasis on the ill-balanced trade-off between consumer rights 
and copyright that would be introduced by Bill C-61.  Brazil’s sense of national identity and 
cultural heritage – its history of “cultural cannibalism” – make copyright reform a natural 
thing to support, although proponents of reform in Brazil also employ messages which 
appeal to national pride and anti-Americanism. The campaign that came closest to basing 
its message on the IP mechanism itself is the ORG campaign on copyright term extension. 
However, ORG gradually moved away from messages about the balance necessary to 
functioning IP law towards messages about corruption, once it realised its initial messaging 
could not match the emotional appeal of the messaging employed by its opponents.
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Campaign Problem Message 
ACTA Fundamentally changes the 
framework for IP enforcement 
Transparency 
 Graduated 
response 
(France) 
Favours industry with outdated 
model for exploiting copyrights 
Privacy, access to justice 
Graduated 
response 
(NZ) 
 
Favours industry with outdated 
model for exploiting copyrights 
Privacy, access to justice 
Brazil Copyright law should favour all 
sections of society, not just media 
corporations 
"Cultural cannibalism", 
national identity, national 
pride, anti-Americanism 
FC4C Anti-circumvention, increased 
scope of liability for infringement 
Consumer rights, privacy, 
freedom of expression, anti-
Americanism 
M
o
st IP
- 
re
la
te
d
 
Term 
Extension 
Does not incentivise creation, locks 
up cultural heritage for no 
commercial gain 
Need to balance needs of 
users and creators, policy not 
evidence-based, corrupt 
 
How should campaigners feel about this? It is natural for campaigners who want to succeed 
to pick the messages that are going to speak loudest to most people. As many campaigners 
observed, without an emotional message, grassroots mobilisation is more difficult, even 
impossible.  
But if the campaign message is wildly different from the campaign goal or motivation, will 
this shore up problems later on? It is too easy to imagine legislators coming up with 
solutions to the concerns on which the messaging focuses, which do not address the 
concerns of the campaign motivation or goal. In this scenario, campaigners would have to 
switch messaging mid-campaign to highlight other problems, and this could damage the 
image of their campaign. 
Furthermore, when IP campaigners are working in loose coalition across regions, if they 
each pick messages that diverge from the campaign goal or motivation, those messages may 
differ. As the case study into the ongoing ACTA campaign suggests, if different groups pick 
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different issues from the suite of problems with the treaty, it could end up leaving 
legislators confused as to the real issues. 
If avoiding these potential problems means centring messaging on the IP mechanism itself, 
then is it easier, or harder, to find messaging that is suitably emotional as to appeal to the 
grassroots? Not all countries have a cultural history like Brazil’s which can easily 
accommodate the “remix” message. And as the ORG campaign suggests, campaigners are 
often faced with simple, instinctually appealing messages from the other side (“artists need 
to get paid”) that are difficult to beat with a focus on the IP mechanism. Fair Copyright for 
Canada successfully employed a consumer rights message in its campaign against C-61, 
which allowed it to highlight how copyright law entails trade-offs between creators and 
users and how those trade-offs need to be carefully balanced by legislators. This strategy 
could be repeated in countries with a developed consumer rights movement. Should IP 
reformists accept that the consumer rights agenda is the most appropriate home for their 
concerns, or is there room for IP-centred messaging that calls for action from citizens, and 
not consumers, that finds its home in the civil rights movement? 
Finally, does campaigning using emotional messages that are removed from the IP 
mechanism consign campaigners to fighting reactive, as opposed to proactive campaigns? 
Access to health initiatives that seek to reform the global IP regime suggest that this is not 
the case, but are they an exception? Could familiar consumer and civil rights, such as 
privacy, or freedom of expression, be harnessed in order to launch a proactive campaign for 
change in the copyright sphere? The test will be whether the WIPO Development Agenda, 
which uses the narrative of development to project proactive IP reform campaigns onto the 
global stage, turns out successfully. 
The campaign against ACTA presents an opportunity for campaigners to forge a strong, 
common message about IP reform that is a good fit for describing the right for citizens of 
the developing world to have access to medicine and an equally good fit for the right for 
consumers in the developed world to have access to innovation in music services. That is 
quite some challenge. As one campaigner observed: 
There’s a consensus view on IP which is wrong.  It’s the wrong vision, but it’s is a very 
well known and popularised and famous vision. The critique of this vision is 
fragmented. It is associated with piracy and ‘we don’t want to pay’ and, you know, ‘no 
business model’ and a sort of hippydom. 
A global movement? 
During the course of this research, it has become clear that different types of campaign 
appear to flourish in different types of country. 
Canada, for example, falls into a group of countries with similar characteristics, some of 
which have also seen successful grassroots mobilisation against draconian IP enforcement 
proposals. Like New Zealand, Canada is a developed country that is fairly small and does 
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not have a large lobbying infrastructure in place. Other countries with similar profiles 
include the Nordic countries. 
But can grassroots campaigns, mobilised online, translate into other “types” of country? For 
example, countries where there is a larger lobbying presence on behalf of rightsholders? 
The answer proffered by this research is a tentative “yes”. The experience in France and the 
UK, where both domestically and at EU level there is a large rightsholder lobbying presence, 
are positive, and techniques employed in New Zealand and Canada have also been 
employed in France and the UK, with some very significant success. The forecast for the US 
is less clear. Each of these campaigns has their own characteristics, and it remains for 
activists in countries not studied here to take up or re-examine the tools this research 
identifies, and to try them out for themselves. 
What about developing countries? The online petition against the Cybercrime bill in Brazil 
gives hopeful signs, but it remains the case that this report is dominated by case studies 
from the global North. One reason for this could be that communications technology is less 
advanced in the developing world, making the tools with which to agitate for change less 
accessible to the general population in the global South. However, it should be noted that 
widespread take-up in the global South means that the mobile phone has already 
demonstrated its utility in fights for social justice on issues that are not IP-related. The 
literature provides examples of mobile phone use to gain fair prices for goods and produce 
in rural India, or in mobilising for political change in the Philippines. 
It could be the case that fault lines in the copyright regime only begin to be widely apparent 
once internet use is pervasive amongst the population. The internet makes everyone a 
publisher, making experience of the inflexibilities of the copyright regime much more real 
to many more people. It reduces the marginal cost of reproduction to almost zero, which 
throws copyright enforcement practice into disarray, triggering over-zealous proposals for 
enforcement from rightsholders.  
But we should not assume that the global South simply lags behind the global North, and 
that the problems as experienced by the populations of the global North are about to hit the 
populations of the global South in some five or ten years hence. Technological development 
will not necessarily follow the same pattern in the developing world as it has in the 
developed world. The rise of mobile phones in the global South, and particularly in Africa, 
demonstrates this. Broadly, mobile phones are non-generative platforms connected to 
private networks. This is in contrast to the internet, which is made up of mostly generative 
platforms (PCs) connected to communications networks that were, at one stage, developed 
as public goods. Will these structural differences mute the need for IP reform in the digital 
developing world, and does this matter? Are mobile phones more likely to be the future of 
communications – do they suit a region better that has lower literacy rates and highly 
fragmented national communications systems? What opportunities are inhabitants of the 
global South missing out on, if their networked digital technology is less generative than the 
technology in use in the global North? Is there a role for IP reform campaigners to be 
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advocating for a more internet-like communications network to be established in the 
developing world, or is this beyond their mandate? 
It could simply be the case that governments and citizens of the developing world are 
dealing with other problems: citizens are focussed on securing basic provisions such as 
food, healthcare and education, while legislators are working hard to meet these needs and 
ignoring other “duties” such as copyright enforcement, meaning physical piracy can fill the 
access to knowledge gap left by copyright regimes that perform poorly in a developing 
world market. But if this is the situation now, we should assume that, as the global North 
continues to dictate the global IP enforcement agenda, this will change and is changing. The 
question remains then, if IP reformists are concentrating on fights in the developed world, 
what fights are they missing that are going on in the developing world? 
14 
 
Case Study: Fair copyright for Canada 
 
or several years, Canada has been 
under pressure to ratify the WIPO 
Internet Treaties. In the Summer of 
2007 Canada hosted a meeting of leaders of 
the three countries in the NAFTA group – 
Canada, Mexico and the United States. At that 
meeting it was made clear to Canada that in 
order for them to progress issues on their 
agenda, they would need to make ratifying the WIPO Internet Treaties a priority, creating a 
law modelled on the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In October 2007, when 
the Canadian government set out the Parliamentary agenda, it made clear its intentions to 
move forward on copyright reform. 
Michael Geist, a Canadian 
academic, and the Canada 
Research Chair in Internet and E-
Commerce Law at the University 
of Ottawa, was following these 
developments with interest. He 
was reliably informed that 
Canada’s new Industry Minister, 
Jim Prentice, was likely to put 
forward a bill that did not take 
into account the concerns of IP 
reformists. In December 2007, 
shortly before a copyright reform 
bill was to be put on Canada’s 
Parliamentary order paper, Geist 
launched a Facebook group and 
asked people to join it if they 
were concerned about the 
upcoming bill. 
In the weeks and months before 
the launch of the Facebook group, 
Geist had been preparing the way 
by publishing material that 
questioned what he understood 
would be in the bill. In November 
Location: Canada 
Lead Campaigners: Fair Copyright for 
Canada 
Issue: Section C61 – the 
“Canadian DMCA” 
Aug-07 Canada hosts meeting of NAFTA leaders 
Oct-07 Government announces intention to 
legislate 
Nov-07 Geist publishes op-ed in The Hill Times 
02-Dec-07 Facebook group launched 
07-Dec-07 Copyright bill placed on Notice paper 
08-Dec-07 Protesters attend Industry Minister's 
party 
10-Dec-07 Debate in Canadian Parliament 
13-Dec-07 Introduction of Bill delayed 
13-Dec-07 Facebook Group passes 20,000 
members 
12-Jun-08 Revised Bill finally introduced 
26-Jun-08 Facebook Group reaches 80,000 
members 
07-Sep-08 Election called, C-61 dies on the order 
paper 
F 
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2007 he wrote a piece for The Hill Times, a Parliament Hill insider publication he knew 
would get the attention of Ministers, MPs and lobbyists. In it he second-guessed the 
contents of Prentice’s copyright reforms, and posed ten questions that should be asked in 
response. The article was later quoted back to him in meetings with MPs. In early 
December, Geist published a blog post that listed thirty things concerned Canadians could 
do to stop what he dubbed “The Canadian DMCA”. 
Geist launched the Facebook group, called Fair Copyright for Canada, on 2 December 2007 
with low expectations of participation. But within a day it had 1,000 members. By the 
second day, it had 2,000 members, and by the end of the week, 10,000 members. Inevitably, 
the size of the Facebook group drew the attention of bloggers and the mainstream media – 
it was the first successful attempt to mobilise people on Facebook in Canada, a country with 
a high proportion of Facebook users. This created a virtuous circle: the more people who 
heard about the group, the more people who joined it, and the more people who joined it, 
the more the media talked about it. 
Geist knew the size of the 
Facebook group, and the 
outpouring of concern over the 
new copyright reforms, was 
worrying legislators. Just over a 
week after the Facebook group 
launched, an opposition MP 
raised the issue in Parliament. 
And Geist used the Facebook 
group, as well as allied bloggers 
like BoingBoing.net, to encourage 
people in the Minister’s riding of 
Calgary to attend an open event 
being held for constituents at the 
riding office. Between fifty and 
sixty people showed up. 
These combined pressures meant that the Bill was not introduced before the Christmas 
break, presumably because Prentice and his department realised the opposition they might 
face to the Bill as it stood. In January an amended Bill which Prentice hoped would allay 
some of his opponents’ fears got stuck in the Cabinet approval process. The Bill was further 
delayed by the expectation of an upcoming election. But the election didn’t happen and in 
June 2008, the Bill was finally introduced, as Bill C-61. 
In the six months of delay, Geist had been helping to organise local chapters of the Fair 
Copyright for Canada Facebook group. Geist had run into problems with Facebook, since it 
does not let group administrators message group members all at once, after the group 
reaches a certain size. Setting up new, local groups, was a way to get around this, as well as 
to encourage people to get involved further. Geist worked in a non-hierarchical frame and 
Jim Prentice confronts his critics at his Calgary riding 
Christmas party 
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over time, many of the local groups would become organised and autonomous, releasing 
their own campaigning tools such as wikis which gave people information about how, 
where and when to contact their elected representatives. 
When the bill was introduced in June 2008, it came with a series of additional provisions – 
for example a cap of $500 on liability for downloading copyrighted files without 
permission, and time-shifting provisions for recording broadcasts. In the mainstream 
media, it enjoyed a brief spell of positive, or at least mixed, coverage, on the day that it 
launched. However, by the end of the week, thanks to negative commentary on the web, this 
story changed, and coverage became almost uniformly negative. Before the introduction of 
the bill the Facebook group had grown to 40,000. On 26 June, the group had over 80,000 
members, with many of the local groups boasting more than 1,000 members apiece. Geist 
was later told that, within three weeks of the Bill being introduced, the Department of 
Industry had received 20,000 letters. 
As the Canadian Parliament broke for the Summer, Geist and the organisers of the local 
chapters made it their goal for every Member of Parliament over the course of the Summer 
to have heard about constituent concern over the Bill. Though they didn’t expect to kill the 
Bill over the Summer, they wanted to ensure that everybody from all parties knew that C-
61 was going to create a problem for them. The strategy looked like it worked – a number of 
MPs and candidates for office said copyright was one of the top three issues they heard 
about all Summer long, and some ridings organised town hall meetings on the C-61 issue. 
In the end, the bill died on the order paper, because the Canadian Government called a 
general election in September 2008. Results of that election – which returned another 
minority Conservative Government – mean that another election could happen early in 
2010. This situation, coupled with the fact that the Industry department is now being kept 
busy by the global economic crisis, could delay the introduction of the Bill until Autumn 
2009, or even the beginning of 2010. In the meantime, and in a situation that is similar to 
the one observed in Brazil, Geist believes that rightsholding industries are ratcheting up 
their lobbying efforts in response to the success of the Fair Copyright for Canada campaign. 
However, when the Bill does re-emerge, Geist is confident that the tools he used and the 
mobilisation it inspired means he can resurrect the resistance to Bill C-61. 
Online tools 
Fair Copyright for Canada succeeded on Facebook because Facebook was the online social 
networking platform of choice in Canada. Other countries may not have so much take-up of 
social networking platforms, or may have take-up of different social networking platforms 
(for example, in Brazil, Google’s Orkhut social networking tool is preferred). Although the 
privacy policies of Facebook did not completely align with Geist’s own views on internet 
privacy, if Geist had not been prepared to trade off these values to engage with the 
Facebook community, Fair Copyright for Canada may not have been such a success. 
Geist’s use of online tools was by no means limited to Facebook, however. He says he was 
prepared to experiment with anything, including wikis, Twitter and FriendFeed.  Having 
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noted that a lot of video mash-ups were appearing on the issue, Fair Copyright for Canada 
launched a YouTube contest over the Summer, asking Canadians to make 61 second videos 
about C-61. Geist reports that although the winning video was strong, the number of entries 
the contest received was lower than expected. 
Had the bill progressed, Geist had hoped to use Twitter to get volunteers to report, in real 
time, proceedings in Committee meetings as the legislation was negotiated. He reports that 
this, more than anything, seemed to alarm officials: 
Every time I mention this to government officials they go bug-eyed.  The very idea… 
everyone’s hearing exactly what’s being said and by the time the MP or whoever it is 
finishes the meeting it’s all over the internet and there are responses to it... So the goal 
of trying to start getting some of that Twitter stuff would be, we’re going to find ways 
to just, you know, maximum speed, maximum dissemination and maximum pressure, 
so there were a lot of things that we have thought about doing to fight back on a bill. 
The success of the local chapters demonstrates that, at least when using online tools, a 
distributed organisational structure is the best option. Geist: 
“I always emphasise, especially to individuals active for the first time, that they should 
say, they were looking sometimes for prepared speaking notes, and my view always 
was that we don’t want prepared speaking notes.  You need to become informed about 
what the bill is and what its implications are, but we don’t want to turn into a mirror 
image of the recording industry…  We actually want you to speak from the heart 
about what your own view is, warts and all.  That will have more impact.” 
There were limitations to the tools Geist used, especially Facebook. After membership 
passed the 1,000 mark, Geist was unable to message the entire group, because of limits set 
by Facebook to avoid spam (the limit has since been upped to 5,000, but this would still 
have been no use for Geist). And because of the choice to use Facebook, Geist – unlike other 
campaigners, for example in the UK – did not have access to the email addresses of 
Canadians concerned about C-61, so could not take grassroots messaging activities out of 
Facebook. And now, although the Facebook group is dormant, because Geist knows he may 
want to resurrect the group, he has to regularly remove a lot of spam messages that get 
posted to the group page. 
Offline campaigning 
The success of Fair Copyright for Canada was not all about Facebook. After the success of 
the Facebook group, Geist quickly moved aspects of the campaign offline and into the “real” 
world, for example through encouraging relevant group members to attend Jim Prentice’s 
Calgary riding party. 
Geist also directed Canadians to communicate their concerns through well-established 
official mediums. Half of Geist’s “30 things you can do” are about writing letters to official 
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bodies, with other established forms of protest, such as petition signing and consumer 
boycotts, also suggested. 
The media attention that the novelty of the Facebook protest attracted to Geist’s campaign 
is something that may not be able to be repeated, at least in Canada: 
It probably would be far less effective today.  So if you had a group of even 100,000 
people, I think it would get attention but I don’t think that they would see that as a big 
deal where now there’s lots of groups that have grown to that kind of scope.  If Ashton 
Kutcher can get a million people to follow him on Twitter, then these numbers just 
don’t mean that much anymore.  And so the whole key is how can you go ahead and 
convert?  I think my goal always was if we can get 10-20% to do at least one thing, if 
you’re big enough that’s going to have an impact. 
The right message 
Fair Copyright for Canada had a campaign message that appealed on three levels. The core 
message was one of consumer rights. Messaging asked Canadians to think about what C-61 
would mean for them in terms of what they could do with their CDs, DVDs, cell phone etc.  It 
asked students to think of what C-61 would mean for what they do as a student in terms of 
the electronic books they buy.  And it asked parents to think of what C-61 would mean for 
them in terms of, for example, making back-up copies of their children’s favourite videos. 
Geist: 
For the broader public a lot of it was very much ‘They’re telling you it’s about 
filesharing.  It’s not.  It’s actually about your property rights’ 
The consumer message played well in the media, because it spoke to people’s everyday 
lives: 
Especially to the media, you say ‘Well, do you realise that the legislation says finally 
that you can record a television show, but it creates twelve conditions in order to be 
able to do it, and you better be sure that if you’re using a PVR that it doesn’t record 
any repeats because you can only record it the once, you have to delete it after a short 
period of time.’  And they’re like, ‘Really?  What?  I mean, how can that be?’ 
On top of this was a message about civil rights – about the effects the legislation would have 
on privacy, and on the right to free expression, in terms of letting Canadians be creators and 
speak for themselves. Finally, the message appealed to a sense of national pride, and in 
particular to latent anti-Americanism. Campaigners could message on the fact that the Bill 
was being introduced in response to US pressure. 
In sum, Geist describes the basic message of the campaign thus: 
Essentially, the message that ultimately got out there was, ‘Holy shit, this really is 
going to affect me and I don’t… why are we doing this kind of backward approach? 
What’s going on?’ 
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Working the inside track 
Geist was in a uniquely good 
position to head-up the Fair 
Copyright for Canada campaign, 
given that he had a significant 
public profile as a blogger and 
columnist, as well as contacts 
with a number of insider 
stakeholders. 
The success of the Fair Copyright 
for Canada campaign relied to 
some extent on inside 
information Geist was able to get 
from his stakeholder contacts. 
Geist identifies government 
relations officers for major 
corporations as good sources of 
information.  
It’s important for campaigners to 
understand where IP policy is 
formed in the legislature. Often, 
as in Canada and the UK, it will be 
the responsibility of more than 
one Government department. 
Advocates can take advantage of 
differences in opinion between 
departments with shared 
responsibility for IP policy, to 
delay new legislation, or to ally 
with the department with the 
more reformist agenda in order 
to get inside information. 
Further resources 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/ 
http://www.faircopyrightforcanada.ca/ 
http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=6315846683 (Facebook group) 
 
Lessons from the campaign 
Provide analysis. Geist provided detailed analysis 
of the bill's contents throughout the campaign. 
Protest where the people are. Fair Copyright for 
Canada succeeded on Facebook because Facebook 
was the online social networking platform of choice 
in Canada. Geist had to trade off his privacy 
concerns to engage with the Facebook community, 
but if he hadn't, Fair Copyright for Canada may not 
have been such a success. 
Take the campaign through established 
channels. Geist quickly moved aspects of the 
campaign offline and into the “real” world. Half of 
Geist’s “30 things you can do” were about writing 
letters to official bodies (elected representatives, 
government departments, educational institutions), 
with other established forms of protest, such as 
petition signing and consumer boycotts, also 
suggested. 
Encourage local groups. Don't try to micro-
manage their activities - distributed systems are 
more efficient and letting people speak from the 
heart will have the most impact. 
Get the message right. Geist asked Canadians to 
imagine what the Bill might mean to them. 
Know what's going on inside Government. Geist 
was in a good position to head-up the Fair Copyright 
for Canada campaign, given that he had a public 
profile as a blogger and columnist, as well as 
contacts with a number of insider stakeholders. 
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Case Study: Graduated Response in France 
 
n September 2007, the French Culture 
Minister asked Denis Olivennes, former 
CEO of French music chain FNAC, to 
investigate responses to copyright 
infringement online. Two months later, 
Olivennes came back with a report entitled Le 
développement et la protection des œuvres 
culturelles sur les nouveaux réseaux (The 
development and the protection of cultural works on new networks).  In it, he proposed a 
“graduated response” to those accused of infringing copyright across peer-to-peer 
filesharing networks, ultimately resulting in their disconnection from the internet. 
The proposals did not come as a surprise. During the transposition of the European Union 
Copyright Directive (EUCD) into French law and the subsequent passing of DADVSI (Loi sur 
le Droit d'Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l'Information – Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights in the Information Society) into French law, similar proposals had been 
put forward. Back then, they had been crushed by the French Constitutional Council, but 
campaigners knew to expect their return. 
A group of campaigners, some of 
whom had previously fought anti-
circumvention provisions in the 
DADVSI (under the EUCD.info 
banner) and/or software patents in 
Europe, came together to fight the 
graduated response proposals. As 
Government and industry agreed to 
take forward the Olivennes Report 
in the shape of the Olivennes Bill, 
later to become known as the 
HADOPI Law, these campaigners 
came together to found La 
Quadrature du Net (“Squaring the 
Net”). The organisation was 
officially launched in March 2008. 
Because France would hold the 
Presidency of the EU in the second 
half of 2008, Europe was a key venue for la Quadrature to launch their campaign. In March 
2008 they joined a loose coalition of European campaigners, led by EFF Europe, in 
Location: France / EU 
Lead campaigners: La Quadrature du 
Net 
Issue: Graduated 
Response 
I 
Sep-07 Olivennes report commissioned 
Nov-07 Graduated response proposals tabled 
Mar-08 Launch of La Quadrature du Net 
Apr-08 European Parliament adopts Bono 
Report 
May-08 Telecoms Package campaign begins 
Sep-08 First vote on the Telecoms Package 
Nov-08 French Senate votes through HADOPI 
law 
Mar-09 Launch of internet blackout campaign 
Apr-09 French National Assembly rejects 
HADOPI  
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campaigning for amendments to Guy Bono MEP’s report on the cultural industries. The 
campaign was successful, and the report aligned the European Parliament to a non-binding 
statement that condemned disconnecting citizens from the internet in any but the most 
extreme circumstances. 
In May 2008, La Quadrature became aware of a suite of disjointed proposals in revisions to 
a complex group of European directives (known collectively as the Telecoms Package), 
revisions intended to update the regulation of telecommunications networks. La 
Quadrature describe these proposals as a “Trojan horse” that would covertly deliver the 
graduated response scheme to European member states: 
There were 8 or 10 bits of it. They were mostly harmless when taken separately, but 
altogether they shaped the whole scheme we were familiar with in France. 
Again in coalition with other groups, La Quadrature worked to neutralise the proposals by 
promoting a series of favourable amendments to the legislation. Key in this campaign was 
getting the plenary vote on the Package postponed from 2 September, right at the start of 
the EU Parliamentary session, to 24 September. This allowed for almost a month of 
significant campaigning, that in turn resulted in a positive outcome: 90% of amendments 
they promoted rated as “+++” (the most important) were adopted. As a result the package 
has now gone to a second reading, and could well be delayed until after the European 
elections. 
Back in France, despite La Quadrature’s best efforts, and despite the obvious steer from 
Europe, the French Senate voted almost unanimously in favour of adopting HADOPI in 
A few screenshots from the HADOPI blackout campaign 
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November 2008. However, after a concerted “internet blackout” campaign, combined with 
other lobbying and media interventions from La Quadrature in the first months of 2009, the 
French National Assembly voted to reject the law in April 2009. A revised version of the 
proposals is expected to go in front of French legislators in due course. 
Ambitions, practicalities, strategy 
La Quadrature had been motivated to form since the French elections of May 2007, which 
brought in an administration they feared would have no qualms about compromising the 
civil liberties of internet users in favour of corporate interest. La Quadrature had hoped to 
promote a more positive agenda, picking up on the “licence globale” proposals put forward 
but quickly (and, arguably, undemocratically) rejected during the DADVSI negotiations. The 
proposals would have initiated a flat tax on internet connections to provide new revenue 
for creators in exchange for the right to share copyrighted works over peer to peer 
networks, making France one of the first countries to “legalise” peer-to-peer filesharing. 
However, as the Olivennes proposals took shape in late 2007, La Quadrature understood 
that this was their chance to bring public attention to a number of key issues in legislation 
on copyright and new technologies: network neutrality; the internet connection as a civil 
right; the unacceptable nature of filtering technologies; and the high levels of technical 
illiteracy in the French administration.  
The goal of the organisation was to combine their experience of campaigning at the 
grassroots with their experience of the legislative process in order to bring back the 
citizen’s voice to law-making. To achieve this goal, they built tools, such as 
politicalmemory.org, which allowed citizens to easily track and contact their elected 
representatives. And they produced condensed versions of complex policy papers, to give 
ordinary people easy insight into legislative proposals being discussed: 
On the one hand, we make the information accessible; on the other hand, we make the 
channels towards the elected representatives accessible. And in the middle we make 
calls to campaign. 
Working in Europe 
La Quadrature were fighting graduated response on at least two fronts. In contrast to the 
UK campaign against term extension, where the push for an increase to copyright term 
needed to be fought first domestically and then subsequently at the European level, for La 
Quadrature, the battles took place almost simultaneously. This had positive effects – 
arguments won in Europe, such as with the Bono report, were more likely to echo back 
home (and vice versa). It also had less positive effects – the complexity and intensity of 
campaigning against the Telecoms package could well have prevented La Quadrature from 
campaigning during the Senate vote with the same intensity they later campaigned – 
successfully – during the National Assembly vote. 
Each time La Quadrature worked in Europe, they did so in coalition. La Quadrature stress 
that coalition working is a vital strategy for them. But they also stress that coalitions work 
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well when they are achieved through informal, personal connections, rather than 
structured or formalised arrangements: 
The coalition aspect is something that is important. It was made in a very informal 
way out of contacts with key people in the major countries. By gaining the trust of 
people around our analysis, that allowed us to trigger the European movement. 
They also actively encourage other activists to take the material on their wiki into different 
directions, describing new volunteers who start initiatives that are out of their control as 
“very, very useful”. 
The importance of rigour 
The most important tool for La Quadrature was the rigour and robustness of their analysis 
– and not just for inspiring coalition-making.  During the National Assembly campaign, they 
encouraged citizens to send a 42-page dossier on the HADOPI law to their representatives 
in the Assembly . They understood that this analysis needed to be watertight: 
One key of all this might be that people expect rigour and precision in our analysis. So, 
because we have precise analysis, because we use the correct terms and we have the 
proper reference to the legal text, then we cannot be attacked. Then the journalists 
trust us, other groups trust us, and we are successful with what we do. 
La Quadrature say that occasionally they felt a lack of legal resources within their 
organisation, which meant they needed to seek analysis from other parties. This incurred 
delays. But they stress that waiting was preferable to making mistakes in the analysis. 
Messaging the media 
The emphasis on rigour affected how la Quadrature shaped their messaging. For La 
Quadrature, messaging started with a detailed level of analysis, and was “distilled” from 
there: 
Coming from… the pile of amendments to a weekly list of short analysis, [then] to a 
shortlist of the most problematic amendments, [then] to an analytical press release 
describing this shortlist and specifying the problem, [then] to a quick press release 
summarising those problems… [then] to the quotes in the press release that 
summarises the summary, [then] to the way you deliver these quotes to the media. I 
think this is all the same message that you make shorter and shorter and shorter and 
shorter all the time. 
During heavy media days, messages would be further honed “on the hoof”, as spokespeople 
for La Quadrature put messages into practice, and saw what worked well. During the period 
around the National Assembly vote, La Quadrature broke all media records, getting 
coverage on all the major news channels and newspapers in France.  
La Quadrature found the media was on their side, particularly when one Minister described 
them as “just five guys in a garage”. He would later regret the comment, as the media used it 
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to portray the fight over HADOPI 
as one of David versus Goliath, 
and to illustrate both the 
Minister’s ignorance about the 
internet (the “just some guys in a 
garage” story lies behind many 
internet businesses that are 
global success stories today) and 
dismissal of the public outcry 
over the law (one political 
opponent responded “They are 
not five guys in a garage. They are 
millions!”). 
Although in contrast to other 
campaigners, La Quadrature 
downplay the role of email lists in 
their campaign, they do stress 
that their journalist email list was 
an important tool in the campaign 
against graduated response. 
Agitating the grassroots 
Based on their experience, La 
Quadrature believe that the 
proper time to launch a 
grassroots campaign is one or 
two weeks before the event upon 
which the campaign is focussed 
(for example, the National 
Assembly vote). Their messaging 
appears to follow a three-step 
template: 
 You have a problem 
 Your civil liberties are 
under threat 
 There is something you 
can do 
Like the Creative Freedom Foundation in New Zealand, they recommend keeping actions 
simple and have a graduating series of actions people can undertake – from actions that suit 
Lessons from the campaign 
Work with what you've got. If an opportunity to 
campaign arises that communicates the core values 
of your organisation, take it. La Quadrature had 
initially started with a proactive agenda, but they 
seized the opportunity to campaign against 
HADOPI. 
De-mystify the legislative process. The new tools 
of the internet are an opportunity to put the voice of 
the citizen back into law-making. Create simple, 
informative websites that help citizens navigate the 
institutions of government. Wikis are a good way to 
do this with limited resources. 
Work in coalition. Making an impact in the EU is 
hard, but small groups loosely joined can make a 
difference. Encourage people  from other member 
states to join in and don't try and manage their 
activities. 
Stay rigorous! If you are a campaign group 
producing original analysis, be aware that it will be 
under special scrutiny. Mistakes will cost you. 
Distil your message for the media. Stay true to 
your analysis but make the messages shorter and 
shorter.  
Keep messages to the grassroots simple. Show 
them how the problem will affect them, and give 
them simple steps to change things. 
Let people come to you. An internet blackout 
campaign will capture people when they least 
expect to be sent campaigning messages.  
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those who want to just add their name to something, to people who want to spend days 
phoning their elected representatives or inviting them to meet face to face.  
The internet blackout campaign they initiated (inspired by the New Zealand campaign) 
originated from their own and their coalition partners’ websites, and spread virally over the 
net. As with the Creative Freedom Foundation, La Quadrature gave people support in 
blacking out aspects of their presence on the web (see 
http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/HADOPI_BlackOut). And many of the “HADOPI 
blackout” pictures they supplied contained embedded links back to pages on La 
Quadrature’s website that gave instructions on how to contact your representative in the 
National Assembly. An impressive gallery of HADOPI blackout actions is maintained at 
http://www.laquadrature.net/HADOPI-blackout-gallerie. 
During the period around the National Assembly vote, the record for incoming email on one 
issue at the French Parliament was broken. During the vote itself, the record for 
simultaneous connections to the National Assembly webcast stream was also broken. La 
Quadrature estimate that tens of thousands of French citizens contacted their 
representatives to protest against HADOPI. 
La Quadrature identify their wiki and IRC channel as key tools in organising and amplifying 
their campaigning activities. They see email as less important and believe that the blackout 
campaign, in bringing web users from all over the internet to their message (rather than 
broadcasting their message to web users using mass emails) was a highly effective means of 
campaigning. 
Further resources 
http://www.laquadrature.net/en 
http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/HADOPI_BlackOut  
26 
 
Case Study: Opening up debate in Brazil 
 
n 1998, on the basis of what was for all 
intents and purposes a symbolic vote in 
the Brazilian Congress, a new Copyright 
Act for Brazil was passed. It transformed 
Brazilian copyright law into one of the 
strictest regimes in the world. That the law 
had no concept of fair use, or fair dealing of 
copyrighted works, and a permissions system for the use of copyrighted works that was 
highly limited, was in a great part the result of an absence of civil society pressure during 
the drafting process. The law was drafted in accordance with private interests, and any 
debate around provisions of the law was restricted to disputes around the divergent 
interests of national and international rightsholding industries. 
From 2002, new stakeholders and constituents from civil society have been gradually 
joining a public debate about copyright reform. The public debate was initially seeded by 
scholars, but has been amplified by various other communities and civil society 
constituents. Public debate on copyright reform is now mainstream, to the extent that it is 
unlikely that a law such as the 1998 Copyright Act could be passed again. Copyright reform 
has chalked up a number of campaign success along the way, and the Brazilian Ministry of 
Culture is about to release a draft Bill amending the 1998 Act that promises to redress the 
balance in Brazilian copyright law, at least in part. This case study looks at how – and why – 
the public debate changed in Brazil over this period. 
Proactive beginnings 
Copyright reform in Brazil was driven by proactive campaigns such as the Free Software 
Forum, and important parts of the academic sector in Brazil. The Brazil Free Software 
Forum (FISL), which is held annually in Porto Allegre, attracts thousands of participants 
and is currently on its tenth edition. For instance, it was here, in June 2004, that Creative 
Commons Brazil was launched by Brazilian academics, journalists, industry 
representatives, artists and others, led by the FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro, to an 
audience of 2,000 people – by far the biggest audience for a CC licence launch in the world 
before or since.  
The Free Software movement, and other NGO´s such as IDEC (Institute for Consumer 
Defence), became important, proactive copyright reform campaigns in Brazil. This public 
interest in copyright traces back a year earlier, when Harvard’s Berkman Centre for 
Internet and Society had held its iLaw programme in Rio de Janeiro, where John Perry 
Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, had debated the economics of 
culture with newly appointed Culture Minister and national cultural hero Gilberto Gil. 
Location: Brazil 
Lead campaigners: Multi-party 
Issue: Creating a public 
debate in Brazil 
I 
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Although neither the copyleft philosophy that underpins Free and Open Source Software, 
nor the “some rights reserved” approach of Creative Commons, challenge the fundamentals 
of the copyright system, understanding these alternative systems allowed officials to more 
immediately understand the 
restrictions that Brazilian copyright 
law, as it stood after the 1998 Act, 
placed on creativity. So it was that in 
December 2006, responding to an 
aggregation of movements and issues 
of which the proactive reform agenda 
was a main feature, the Ministry of 
Culture created a National Copyright 
Forum. The Forum was to take the 
form of a series of open seminars 
across Brazil, with a view to 
amending the 1998 Act once a way 
forward had emerged from the 
discourse. 
Fertile ground 
Brazil was well-placed to progress 
ideas about copyright reform, 
because the message of reform spoke 
directly to Brazilian national identity 
and to Brazilian national aspirations. 
The philosophy of proactive 
copyright reform movements like 
copyleft and Creative Commons 
already had mainstream appeal in 
Brazil, thanks to the country’s 
cultural history. So-called “cultural 
cannibalism” – the building of culture out of and on top of other cultures – is seen as a 
central characteristic of Brazilian creative life. This tradition was strengthened with the 
advent of Tropicalia, the sound associated with Gil and his fellow musicians in the 1970s, 
when electronic guitars were added to Brazilian music to create the Tropicalia sound. 
Remix culture was, therefore, alive and thriving in Brazil well before the advent of the 
networked, digital age.  
Furthermore, intellectual property reform was seen as an opportunity for Brazil on the 
geopolitical stage. It was understood early on that Brazil could make an economic impact by 
presenting an alternative to strong IP that was economically productive. Adopting such a 
strategy could not only ensure Brazil a place at the top table in global economic discussion, 
it could also insert Brazilian ideas into the international agenda. Early indicators of the 
Feb-98 Brazilian Copyright Act Passed in 
Congress 
Jan-03 Gilberto Gil appointed Minister of 
Culture 
Mar-03 Conference including Gil, Lessig, 
Zittrain, Perry Barlow etc... 
Jun-04 Creative Commons Brazil launched at 
FISL5 
Oct-04 Brazil and Argentina launch the 
Development Agenda at WIPO 
Jun-05 São Paulo statement on exceptions for 
private copying 
Oct-06 IFPI press-launches lawsuits against 
Brazilians suspected of illicitly sharing 
files 
Dec-06 Ministry of Culture launches National 
Copyright Forum  
Oct-07 IIPA complains about  São Paulo 
statement to USTR 
Jul-08 Campaign against Brazilian 
Cybercrime Bill begins 
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success of this strategy include Brazil’s introduction, in partnership with Argentina, of the 
Development Agenda at WIPO in 2004. 
Ivory Towers and Grassroots 
The campaigns for copyright reform were inspired by issues detected by the Brazilian 
academy, including well known institutions such as the Center for Technology & Society at 
the FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro, the University of São Paulo´s GPOPAI, the 
Communication School at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and others. Also, 
Brazilian civil society – students’ unions, consumer groups and the Free Software Forum – 
worked closely with one another. Understandably, the academy maintains a non-partisan, 
unbiased analysis. But other key network leaders in grassroots movements have been 
active and political, taking this analysis and giving it to civil society as a vital tool to seed 
popular action over key issues. 
“Copiar Livro e Direito” 
After the Associação Brasileira de Direitos 
Reprográficos (ABDR – Brazil’s major publishing 
industry body) began prosecuting Universities who 
allowed students to photocopy portions of 
copyrighted books in a practice the ABDR 
maintained went beyond the narrow exceptions 
provided for by Brazil’s copyright law, students 
began agitating for change. Student Unions in 
campuses across Brazil formed a short-lived 
movement called “Copiar Livro é Direito” (“To Copy 
a Book is a Right”). 
Publishers argued that if libraries were poorly 
stocked, students should buy their own copies of 
vital course books, and refused to license campus copy shops. But the economic realities in 
Brazil mean that most people could not afford to do this – research showed that one year of 
course books could cost as much as a year’s salary on Brazil’s minimum wage. 
São Paulo University issued a statement in June 2005 which sought to safeguard Brazil’s 
constitutional guarantee of access to education and culture. It stated that so long as 
students had no intention to profit from the endeavour, they should be permitted to copy 
whole chapters from books, and to copy works licensed under Creative Commons or – most 
controversially – works which were out of print in Brazil. Later, the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) would petition the USTR to encourage São Paulo 
University to reverse this policy as part of the Special 301 report process. 
Logo of the “Copiar...” campaign 
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Although the São Paulo 
University statement remains in 
place, ultimately the “Copiar...” 
movement was short-lived. This 
is ascribed to those students who 
had led the movement graduating 
and moving on. Those activists in 
the faculty who valued the input 
of “Copiar...” now recognise the 
need to support students’ 
movements to ensure they 
remain sustainable beyond the 
school days of the students who 
initiate them. 
The IFPI in Brazil 
In October 2006, the 
International Federation for the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
staged a conference in Rio de 
Janeiro’s prestigious Copacabana 
Palace Hotel. The conference was 
intended to sweeten the launch of 
IFPI lawsuits against twenty 
Brazilians suspected of sharing 
files unlawfully over the internet. 
John Kennedy, Chairman and CEO 
of IFPI, made the announcement, 
and the Brazilian Association of 
Disc Producers (ABPD) turned up 
to support it. 
Enrolment was open to all, and 
three law professors from the 
Center for Technology & Society 
at the FGV Law School in Rio de 
Janeiro duly enrolled. Although 
their accreditation was accepted, 
when they arrived on the day, 
security guards refused to let 
them in. Given there was plenty of 
space inside the conference, the 
academics believe they were refused entry in order to stop them asking uncomfortable 
questions at a recording industry-staged press event. 
Lessons from the campaign 
Plug copyright reform issues into a national 
frame. Brazil was well-placed to progress ideas 
about copyright reform, because the message of 
reform spoke directly to the Brazilian idea of 
“cultural cannibalism” and to Brazilian national 
aspirations. 
Get to know your local creative industries. 
Become aware of the cultural industries in your 
country, so you can understand the real relevance of 
your opponents. Get data. What is the size of the 
market? Are the industry enabled to publish, for 
instance, CDs, books? How many bookshops are 
there in the country?  
Establish good relations with local media. Local 
media will be interested in well-informed and 
reliable local sources on what are often 
international issues. Let them know you will 
comment on a wide range of “new technology” 
issues. 
Combine academic integrity with grassroots 
action. Get together with your allies, understand 
who they are and work with them in partnerships. 
In Brazil legal opinions and policy papers produced 
by academics were used by Free and Open Source 
Software advocates as calls for action among wider 
civil society, which in turn put pressure on the 
media and politicians to act in accordance with 
institutional advice. 
Ensure your organisations are sustainable. 
Student groups can be a great catalyst for change, 
but remember that students graduate, and that the 
next generation of students need to be involved in 
campaigns early on to ensure a sustainable cycle of 
activism. 
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However if this was indeed the IFPI’s intentions, their strategy back-fired. Almost all press 
coverage of the event was split between outrage that Brazilians should be sued by wealthy 
Western corporations, and more outrage that Brazilian experts should be refused entry to 
the conference. Whether this had a long term effect on the IFPI’s strategy in Brazil is 
unclear, but it remains the case that the IFPI is yet to launch any lawsuit against Brazilians 
suspected of illicitly sharing copyrighted files. 
Cyberactivsmo campaign 
In July 2008, after a punitive bill dubbed “the Cybercrime Bill” that included minimum five 
year jail sentences for copyright infringement was passed by the Brazilian senate, the 
Brazilian academy raised several problems and activists started a campaign. Academics 
from the University of São Paulo, Federal University of Bahia, the Center for Technology & 
Society at the FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro and others worked up a twenty-page legal 
opinion, analysing the bill article-by-article. Others in the IP reform movement, such as the 
Free Software community, and other members of the Brazilian academy, spread the word 
about an online petition. They then targeted Brazil’s Lower Congress with the petition, 
which had attracted more than 140,000 signatures. The mainstream media picked up on 
the story, which added pressure on the Congress. Congress stopped the Bill and called for a 
public hearing. The issue is still ongoing. 
Further resources 
http://www.a2kbrasil.org.br/ENG/-Weblog-ENGLISH- 
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Case Study: Guilt on Accusation in New Zealand 
 
he Creative Freedom Foundation was 
set up by Matthew Holloway and 
Bronwyn Holloway-Smith in 2008, in 
response to changes to the law in New 
Zealand that threatened to undermine artists’ 
and public rights in the name of protecting 
creativity. The founders wanted to give a 
unifying voice to New Zealand artists in 
debates about changes to the law made in their name, where they felt artists were not 
represented and public awareness was low. Their launch campaign was against a new 
provision in New Zealand’s Copyright Act – Section 92A – which mandated that internet 
service providers adopt a policy of terminating the internet accounts of so-called “repeat 
copyright infringers”. 
Section 92A had been introduced in 2008, prior to the setting up of Creative Freedom, but 
was yet to be implemented. The Creative Freedom Foundation made it their goal to raise 
awareness among the public about Section 92A, with the ultimate goal of having the law 
repealed or significantly amended. In November 2008, they designed a website to promote 
the campaign, releasing it to a hand-picked group of legal experts, artists, media 
commentators and other opinion-
formers for comment and feedback. 
Following revisions to the site that 
were guided by this process, the 
website was eventually launched on 
17 December 2008. 
Creative Freedom had decided to use 
the internet as the core tool for the 
campaign against Section 92A. The 
decision was based on how they 
thought they could raise the most 
awareness given their limited 
resources (both of the founders have 
day jobs and ran the campaign in 
their spare time), and was also based 
on the nature of the legislation they 
were campaigning against – the issue 
related directly to the internet so it 
Location: New Zealand 
Lead campaigners: Creative Freedom 
Foundation 
Issue: Graduated 
response 
T 
Apr-08 
 
Section 92A introduced, 
implementation date set. 
17-Dec-08 Creative Freedom Foundation 
website launched 
16-Feb-09 
 
New Zealand internet blackout 
begins 
19-Feb-09 Protest outside Parliament – 
petition handed over 
23-Feb-09 Prime Minister announces Section 
92A will be delayed 
23-Mar-09 NZ Government announces it will 
remove section 92A 
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made sense to have an internet-based campaign. However, during the later stages of their 
campaign, protests and campaigning activities did take place offline too. 
The most striking feature of the Creative Freedom campaign against Section 92A was the 
so-called “New Zealand internet blackout”, which saw a significant number of internet users 
in New Zealand and internationally black out aspects of their online profiles – avatars, 
status-update messages and whole website pages – in protest against Section 92A. On 23 
March 2009, the New Zealand Government announced that they would remove Section 92A 
of the New Zealand Copyright Act, and begin redrafting it. 
Strategies and goals 
Holloway-Smith identifies the feedback given about the Creative Freedom website by their 
group of “beta-testers” in the early stages of their campaign as crucial for the campaign’s 
later success: 
One key piece of feedback that was received was that no-one wants to have to care 
about an issue.  It’s quite hard convincing people that it’s worth their time and energy 
to come on board and respond to an issue and so it takes time.  People don’t 
understand or dedicate themselves to every issue that comes along so you need to 
make it really easy and significantly convincing for them to care. 
The campaign was faced with the challenge of making the issues presented by Section 92A 
accessible and easy to understand and get behind by the general public. Of significant 
concern was the fact that those accused of copyright infringement would be so at the behest 
of rightsholding organisations, and would have no opportunity to defend themselves in a 
neutral court of law. In the end, Creative Freedom came up with the phrase “Guilt Upon 
Accusation”: 
The ‘Guilt upon Accusation’ phrase that we used for the first part of the campaign was 
coined as the sound bite version of the issue and subsequently it became a kind of 
brand and beyond the brand I guess this was kind of the capture point. 
Once Creative Freedom had captured the public’s attention and support for the issue, the 
website was specifically structured to provide increasing levels of information and 
participation opportunities based on the increasing levels of thought and time individuals 
felt they wanted to dedicate to the campaign: 
We had a list of ways that people could participate so the first step was to sign the 
petition.  The second step was asking people to email their friends about the issue and 
we provided a piece of sample text that they could use or modify... We provided banner 
adverts for people to place on their own website and that linked back to our site.  And 
then we started to bring in the social media aspect.  So we set up the Facebook group, 
Twitter account and a MySpace page... 
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Campaigning began in earnest in the two weeks before the law was due to come into effect. 
It was then that Creative Freedom encouraged the spread of the internet blackout 
campaign: 
That week was the real turning point for the campaign... There were instructions for 
participating on the website... We asked people to black out their profiles on Facebook, 
Bebo, their Twitter profile pictures, and also to change the appearance of their 
website or their blog and MySpace pages to black and then we provided instructions 
on how to do that and what to say, so Facebook would be one example, where we 
provided the black profile images that people could use... 
Although Creative Freedom have no hard statistics on how many people acted on their call 
to action, they estimate that tens of thousands of people supported the internet blackout 
campaign in some way. Anecdotal evidence suggests there was a high take-up both within 
New Zealand and internationally, with many high-profile figures, including British 
comedian Stephen Fry, taking 
part in the internet blackout. The 
campaign attracted significant 
media interest, and Creative 
Freedom capitalised on this by 
orchestrating a series of events in 
the week before the law was to be 
implemented, in order to give the 
media something to pick up on 
nearly every day. This kept the 
issue current and alive. 
Throughout the campaign, 
Creative Freedom had been 
collecting signatures on a petition 
protesting Section 92A. On 19 
February, protesters carrying black placards joined Holloway-Smith outside New Zealand’s 
Parliament, where she handed the petition and its 9,000+ signatures to Peter Dunne MP, a 
member of one of New Zealand’s coalition parties. Creative Freedom also gave a copy of a 
song that had been composed about the issue – “The Copywrong Song” – to each of the 122 
members of the New Zealand Parliament. 
During the campaign, Creative Freedom maintained good relations with the media. They 
understood that they needed the media to take their message beyond the online world. 
They describe the media as being broadly supportive of their message, but highlight that 
they occasionally received phone calls from individuals who may or may not have been 
directly attached to the press, who would try and get them to say controversial things (for 
example that they condoned illicit filesharing of copyrighted material), which could 
ultimately have harmed their campaign. Despite being a young and fairly inexperienced 
Protesters gather outside the New Zealand Parliament 
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organisation, they understood 
that they needed to put forward a 
reasonable and professional 
public image in order to be taken 
seriously in the long term. 
Creative Freedom are conscious 
that the New Zealand electoral 
cycle played a part in the success 
of their campaign – Section 92A 
had been introduced by the 
previous Labour government, and 
it was the National Party – who 
won power from Labour in 
November 2008 – who eventually 
scrapped it. They do not wish to 
take all the credit for the 
scrapping of Section 92A, but they 
do assert that the amount of 
public support for their campaign 
was a factor in the legislation’s 
demise. The success of the 
campaign has been a great start 
for the Creative Freedom 
Foundation, and they plan to use 
the momentum that is now 
behind their organisation in New 
Zealand in order to campaign on 
new issues, such as DRM, and 
New Zealand’s role in the ACTA negotiations. They also hope to feed in positively to the 
government’s redrafting of Section 92A. 
The Creative Freedom campaign against Section 92A came very early in their history as an 
organisation, and they describe it as “a bit of a rollercoaster ride”. They found that working 
day jobs as well as working on the campaign meant they were often up working into the 
early hours of the morning, a situation they found “pretty taxing”. Both founders would like 
to approach new campaigns so that they are more manageable, through finding funding for 
their organisation, and through engaging in more forward planning and delegation. One 
other thing that could have helped them during the campaign was software that allowed 
them to update their presence on the various social networking sites they were employing 
all at once, instead of one by one. 
Further resources 
http://creativefreedom.org.nz/  
Lessons from the campaign 
Get feedback. Ask for comments on what you are 
doing from people with a variety of different 
perspectives, people from different professions 
(artists, technologists, lawyers, journalists) and 
with different levels of prior knowledge about the 
issue. 
Keep your message simple and make it easy for 
people to participate in your campaign. Give 
people a simple message, and the option to find out 
more at increasing levels of detail. Give people lots 
of options to take action, from signing a petition to 
turning up at a protest.  
Make sure you have the mainstream media on 
board. They can take your message to a wider 
audience, but remember to stay professional with 
the media at all times, in case they are trying to 
catch you out to get a new angle on a story. 
Keep it fun. “It’s good to try and keep things simple 
and accessible and fun,” say Creative Freedom, 
“You’ve got to enjoy it to keep it going, and to keep 
the energy alive.” 
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Case Study: Copyright term extension in Europe 
 
n February 2008, Charles McCreevy, 
Commissioner for the Internal Market at 
the European Commission, announced 
that his Directorate (DG) would be 
considering the proposal to the extend the 
length of time copyright is afforded to sound 
recordings, from 50 years to 95 years.  
One of the most striking things about McCreevy’s proposal was that it went against 
evidence commissioned by his own DG. In early 2007, the Institute for Information Law at 
the University of Amsterdam (IViR) had been commissioned to look into the case for 
extending term and had concluded that the proposals should not be taken forward. This 
evidence backed up the findings 
of an early study from the UK, 
which had been commissioned 
in 2006. The Open Rights 
Group, who had fought 
proposals to extend term in the 
UK in 2006, prepared to begin 
their campaign afresh. 
Since the 2006 campaign, the 
rhetoric of term extension 
appeared to have changed. 
Whereas in 2006 wealthy, big 
names stars like Cliff Richard 
had spear-headed the 
campaign, with complaints that 
without the copyright term 
extension they would “lose their 
pensions”, this time around the 
measure was said to be of 
benefit to performers and 
session musicians who were not 
household names. It was felt 
that this rhetoric was being 
employed by proponents 
because the “underdog” story 
would play better in the media. 
Dec-06 UK campaign against copyright term 
extension campaign successful 
Jan-07 iVIR publish study rejecting term extension 
for DG Internal Market 
Feb-08 DG Internal Market announces term 
extension proposal 
Feb-08 ORG launch Sound Copyright petition at 
FOSDEM 
Jun-08 ORG ask Commission DGs to reject proposal  
Aug-08 
 
European Commission formally propose term 
extension 
Nov-08 First JURI hearing on proposal 
Jan-09 ORG event in European Parliament 
Feb-09 JURI vote proposal through; ongoing Council 
of Ministers negotiations 
Mar-09 Proposal enters Trialogue discussions 
Apr-09 Parliament vote in favour of compromise 
proposal 
Location: UK/EU 
Lead campaigners: Open Rights 
Group; EFF 
Issue: Copyright term 
extension 
I 
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In late February 2008, in coalition with EFF Europe, ORG launched the Sound Copyright 
campaign, which called on European citizens to sign a petition opposing the term extension. 
The petition was launched at FOSDEM, the annual gathering of free and open source 
software practitioners in Brussels, and by the end of March, over 10,000 people had signed. 
In June 2008, ORG travelled to Brussels to meet with representatives from other 
Commission DGs and urge them to block the proposals. However the proposals eventually 
went through and were put forward formally by the Commission in August 2008. 
Responding to a call for evidence put out by the UK’s Intellectual Property Office ORG 
submitted an evidence-based document which demonstrated that the average European 
performer stood to gain as little as 50¢ per year from an extended term. They made the 
argument that an copyright term extension made in the name of the average performer 
would be a nonsense, and that laws based on nonsense were unlikely to win the support of 
the general public. This was a direct appeal to other initiatives within the EU to strengthen 
the enforceability of copyright law. 
ORG tracked the progress of the proposal through the European Parliament, attending the 
first hearing on the proposal by the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI), co-hosting (with the 
European Green Grouping) their own event in the Parliament in January 2009, and meeting 
with key MEPs on these trips and on separate trips in March and April 2009. They also 
developed a coalition of stakeholders who opposed the proposal. Among them were a 
group of academics from across Europe already active on the issue, as well as consumer 
advocates and digital rights activists from across Europe, sound archivists, performers, 
remix artists, librarians and broadcasters. As well as lobbying MEPs face-to-face and on the 
telephone, ORG and other members of this loose coalition were working behind the scenes 
to influence national governments to block the proposals at Council of Ministers 
negotiations. ORG also encouraged those who signed the Sound Copyright petition to get in 
touch with their MEPs on the issue.  
These strategies combined to complicate – perhaps fatally – the progress of the Directive 
through Parliament. Although the JURI committee voted the proposal through in February, 
a full Parliamentary vote was delayed by blocks established at the Council of Ministers. The 
proposal then went into Trialogue negotiations, as representatives from the Commission, 
Council and Parliament attempted to achieve consensus on some sort of proposal for 
Parliament to vote on before the end of the Parliamentary session and the start of the 
European elections. A proposal to extend the copyright term to 70 years instead of 95 years 
was eventually put before Parliament on 23 April. ORG encouraged petition signers to ask 
their MEPs to support an amendment rejecting the proposal. 222 MEPs supported that 
amendment, with 370 opposing it. In the end, the proposal to extend term was voted in by 
317 in favour, with 178 against and 37 abstentions. The 70 year proposal will now go back 
to the Council of Ministers, where it remains blocked by a significant number of member 
states. 
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Bypassing the media 
ORG are aware that copyright term extension in sound recordings could well be perceived 
as a niche issue. However, they see it as part of a wider mission to wrest the debate around 
copyright reform from the clutches of major rightsholding organisations. They chose to 
message on the fact that the EU proposals had no evidence to back them up, and were not 
being made in the interests of all European citizens, but in the interests of a very select few. 
On an emotional level, this message can have been said to have performed badly, at least 
initially, against the rightsholder message of “poor performers”. As ORG Executive Director 
Jim Killock observes, there are several key aspects of a good campaign: 
It’s got to be important.  It’s got to be immediate.  It’s got to be clear and make a 
moral case. 
ORG’s strongest tools appeared to 
be the cross-European 
independent academic rejection 
of the proposals – but arguments 
here were highly technical and 
didn’t translate easily into moral 
messages. However much the 
message of balancing interests 
and evidence-based policy 
appealed to intellectual property 
insiders, it was hard to translate 
into sound bites for the media. 
ORG’s sustained critique of the 
lack of evidence behind what they 
dubbed the “fairy tale” of the poor performer did in the end have some impact in the 
mainstream media, with ORG’s perspective represented in the national print and broadcast 
media in the UK. But, in comparison to many of the other issues ORG was fighting on at the 
time, their interface with the mainstream media was low. 
Faced with this situation, ORG chose to create its own media. A viral video was 
commissioned (a cartoon called “How Copyright Term Extension Actually Works”), and 
uploaded to YouTube. Details of the video were sent to those who had signed the Sound 
Copyright petition, as well as to high-volume online communities such as BoingBoing.net 
and TorrentFreak.com. In the space of two weeks, it had been watched by over 25,000 
people. The January event was also filmed and uploaded to YouTube, although it attracted 
far fewer views than the cartoon. ORG remain proud of these figures, but are also aware 
that the majority may well represent people who were already concerned about IP reform, 
rather than new converts to their cause. 
Still from “How Copyright Term Extension Actually Works” 
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Grassroots engagement 
In terms of grassroots engagement, the email list generated by the Sound Copyright petition 
was ORG’s main tool for achieving mobilisation. The call to action was almost exclusively 
that petitioners write to their MEPs and in-country representatives, although they also 
invited petitioners to come to the January 2009 Parliament event, with some success. 
ORG used a series of campaign touch points to encourage petitioners to engage with MEPs, 
both events in the legislative agenda (votes at committee, votes in Parliament) as well as 
peripheral events, such as statements from the group of campaigning academics, or the 
ORG YouTube video. In each call to action, they tried to address a different aspect of the 
issue: the poor deal for the performers; the lack of evidence; or the particular views of ORG 
with regards to culture and balanced IP. They gave petitioners briefings that summarised 
the issues, but stressed that petitioners should write to their MEPs in their own words. 
ORG were faced with the challenge posed by form responses that many of the petitioners 
received back from their elected representatives. Although ORG gave clear instructions to 
petitioners about the importance of following up on these form letters with further written 
enquiry, telephone calls or face to face meetings, they are sceptical about how many 
petitioners took up this advice. The sustained timeframe in which ORG asked supporters of 
their campaign to write to their MEPs – which contrasts with the short timeframes of the 
New Zealand and French internet blackouts against graduated response – is also worth 
noting. Nonetheless, ORG received reports – and occasionally complaints – from MEPs 
about the volume of mail they were receiving on the term extension issue. 
In the UK, citizens can engage with their elected representatives (including MEPs) using a 
one-click service called WriteToThem.com. Jim Killock is keen to stress that it is vital that 
such a tool be developed for all EU member states: 
Writetothem.eu is absolutely critical if we want to run these campaigns in the next 
four years.  It shows the contempt in which we seem to hold our European institutions 
and the irrelevance that they are felt to have across Europe. 
Killock believes that the attitude of some MEPs towards the emails they received on the 
back of the term extension issue, coupled with the fact that – less than two months before 
an election – so many of them were willing to vote for term extension despite the clear 
public support for rejecting the proposals, indicates that MEPs still don’t feel accountable to 
their electors. 
Coalition building 
Faced with a massive lobbying effort on the part of rightsholders, ORG’s only hope of 
equalling the impact was to bring other organisations with aligned interests on board.  ORG 
believe that the coalition they have helped build around the term extension proposals will 
be of immense benefit in future campaigning activities. They also believe that it was 
fundamental in complicating – perhaps fatally – the passage of the Directive. 
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One latecomer to the coalition with which ORG hopes to build strong bonds is the Featured 
Artists Coalition, a recently formed group of musicians, including many famous names, 
formed to bypass collecting society and label interests when discussing the future of music 
copyright and the music business in political fora. ORG see a coalition with creators as key 
to advancing a more positive agenda around the internet and copyright in the future, 
wresting the debate from rightsholder interests. 
Although ORG in no sense 
controlled the output of coalition 
partners, they did encourage 
some factions (notably libraries, 
broadcasters, public domain 
record labels and remix artists) to 
put their side of the story to 
legislators. This helped concretise 
the problems within the 
proposals, moving the debate 
away from abstract ideas such as 
balance. ORG also took advantage 
of actions from coalition partners, 
such as public statements and 
open letters from academics or 
from artists, using them as touch 
points for their own campaigning 
activities. 
Within the European consumer 
and citizen activist space, ORG 
helped craft and distribute joint 
statements aimed at legislators, in 
order to make it clear that 
opposition to the proposals came 
not only from the UK, but from 
across Europe. 
Challenges 
The Sound Copyright campaign was ORG’s first campaign in Europe. ORG had to learn the 
complex ins and outs of European political life quickly. However, they gradually grew more 
confident about how the European system worked and in hindsight, they say, they probably 
would have engaged more with legislators early on.  
ORG realised that the power to influence large groups of MEPs is held by a very small 
number of experts and group leaders in Parliament. This situation is difficult to circumvent 
as MEP loyalties are dictated by a complex set of individual, national and party loyalties. 
Lessons from the campaign against term 
extension 
Start petitions early. Even if you only trigger 
grassroots action two weeks before a crucial 
campaign event, you can collect emails addresses 
through initiating a petition early on in your 
campaign. 
Look for other stakeholders. Seek out people from 
different backgrounds who will be affected by the 
legislation, and ask them to make their voices heard 
among legislators. Academics, remix artists, 
broadcasters, librarians and musicians were all part 
of the loose coalition against term extension. 
Create your own media. If your issue is not getting 
the attention it deserves, bypass the mainstream 
media using cartoons or videos of speaking events. 
Make sure people stay interested. It's tough 
keeping the grassroots involved over a sustained 
period. Use campaign touchpoints to renew your 
call to action, or else delay the call to action until 
you really need it. 
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Privately, MEPs admitted that their positions were dictated by “political” considerations 
rather than the balance of evidence. ORG concentrated on building coalitions of MEPs who 
wished to reject the term extension within each party group, even when their party 
officially supported the measure. 
ORG also faced significant logistical challenges running a campaign aimed at Brussels from 
their base in London. The situation was made worse by the fact that the April 2009 plenary 
vote took place in Strasbourg. 
Further resources 
http://www.openrightsgroup.org/ 
http://www.soundcopyright.eu 
http://www.writetothem.com/ 
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Case Study: ACTA in the USA 
 
n October 2007, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), together with 
counterpart bodies in the EU, 
Switzerland and Japan, announced they 
would begin negotiating a new plurilateral 
trade agreement. Called the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), its aim was to enhance intellectual property 
enforcement. But as was to emerge over the following months, the scope of the proposals in 
ACTA went far beyond enforcement against counterfeit goods. 
The campaign against ACTA was, from the beginning, a global one. In June 2008, OSI hosted 
a meeting in the UK that brought together IP reform activists from around the world to 
discuss ongoing and further action to be taken against the treaty initiative. These groups 
and others (notably Fair Copyright for Canada, as well as individuals from New Zealand, 
Sweden and Australia) entered into loose coalition, co-ordinating actions using an email 
list, and sharing information that leaked from the various negotiating parties to the treaty 
to gradually create a full picture of the substantial issues ACTA dealt with. 
The US story 
This case study reflects on the US arm of that global campaign. 
The most striking thing about ACTA was the secrecy that surrounded it. The USTR released 
a short briefing note in February 2008, in order to solicit public comments on the 
proposals. But from the beginning, based on comments that came from rightsholder 
industries about substantive issues within the treaty, IP reform campaigners suspected 
there was more on the table than they were being allowed to see.  
When a document entitled “Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement” – far more substantial than the official USTR briefing note – was released onto 
the whistle-blowing  website Wikileaks in May 2008, these suspicions were confirmed. 
Eddan Katz, International Affairs Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, describes 
two different but equally alarming types of problem presented by ACTA for IP reformists. 
The first is that ACTA as a mechanism demonstrates a new strategy among IP maximalists: 
The opening up of WIPO to broader multi-stakeholders has actually forced the IPR 
enforcement policy-making into darker and darker rooms, and bilateral treaties are 
one context. But that requires some congressional oversight... and so a plurilateral 
agreement... is the answer [in that] it eludes accountability and is specifically designed 
Location: US/global 
Lead Campaigners: Multi-party 
Issue: ACTA 
I 
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to fall in between the cracks of established accountability mechanisms.  And so it 
really is meant to be a dark room where these things are negotiated. 
As well as strategic issues, 
campaigners and advocates 
could also see from leaked 
documents that ACTA 
presented several 
substantial issues too: 
further criminalisation of 
infringement; increased 
scope of infringement 
liability; new powers at the 
borders and over goods in 
transit which could have 
significant impact on, for 
example, the movement of 
life-saving generic drugs; 
and a general creep in the 
maximisation of rights. 
Jamie Love, Director of 
Knowledge Ecology 
International, goes as far as 
to say that: 
ACTA fundamentally 
changes the entire set of 
global norms over the 
enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, even in 
cases where there is political 
support for weaker norms 
on enforcement. 
It was clear to campaigners 
that the ACTA needed to be 
stopped. 
The transparency piece 
A coalition of NGOs in the US came together to discuss strategy, and there was general 
consensus that the most effective way to progress a campaign was to concentrate on the 
lack of transparency around the negotiations. 
23-Oct-07 USTR announces ACTA, simultaneously with 
bodies in EU, Switzerland and Japan 
15-Feb-08 USTR ask for comments, public interest 
groups respond 
22-May-08 Discussion Paper on a Possible Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement leaked 
Jun-08 EFF launch “Sunlight for ACTA” campaign 
Jul-08 EFF and Public Knowledge launch FOIA 
request 
Sep-08 EFF and Public Knowledge launch FOIA suit 
05-Sep-08 USTR posts further notice asking for 
comments, public interest groups respond 
15-Sep-08 100+ organisations send letter asking USTR 
to publish draft agreement 
Dec-08 USTR writes letter to EFF stating reasons 
for withholding documents on ACTA 
Jan-09 USTR issues Vaughn index 
21-Jan-09 Obama announces memo on transparency, 
court case stayed 
19-Mar-09 Attorney General issues guidelines on FOIA 
that interprets Presidential memo 
07-Apr-09 USTR releases 6 page document on contents 
of ACTA 
21-Apr-09 Deadline for USTR/EFF court report into 
status of suit under new guidelines 
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NGOs – following their submissions to the USTR call for comments – had secured meetings 
with the USTR on ACTA. But they had found USTR unwilling to reveal more substance on 
the treaty – indeed they had to push USTR hard to even publish responses they had had to 
their call for comments. In June 2008, EFF launched a grassroots letter-writing campaign 
called “Sunlight for ACTA” asking their supporters to write to their Senators to demand that 
documentation be released. So far, EFF reports, the call has prompted around 2,500 
individuals to write to their Senator. 
In July 2008, the EFF and another public interest NGO, Public Knowledge, submitted an 
official request under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the USTR to reveal the 
contents of ACTA. Although EFF’s FOIA team had been in discussions with USTR about the 
scope of the request since June, after the request was formally submitted, drawn to the 
scope agreed between USTR and EFF, USTR went silent. In September 2008, when the 
deadline for USTR to respond to the request expired, EFF and Public Knowledge filed suit. 
In December 2008, USTR sent EFF a letter claiming they were withholding the information 
requested for national security reasons and under the “deliberative process privilege”.  And 
in January 2009, USTR filed a Vaughn Index, something they are required to do in the 
course of a FOIA lawsuit, which breaks down in detail what they are withholding and why. 
Then, on 21 January, a day after he was inaugurated, President Obama issued a 
memorandum that indicated that his administration would employ improved policies on 
transparency. This delayed the court case significantly, as EFF and USTR waited for the 
Attorney General to issue new FOIA guidelines. These guidelines were eventually issues on 
19 March. On 7 April, the USTR issued a six-page briefing document on ACTA, which went 
further than previous briefs, but not far enough for campaigners.  
David Sobel, Senior Counsel at EFF’s Washington Office and legal lead for the FOIA action 
against USTR, believes that the publishing of this new brief indicates the Attorney General’s 
guidelines have not changed the USTR’s mind about fighting the case. Eddan Katz calls the 
USTR’s six-page release “transparency theatre” and anticipates a “chess-move forward” in 
the campaign for transparency, where the concept is transformed into a request for 
meaningful participation in negotiations by civil society voices currently excluded from the 
debate. 
When USTR and others announced ACTA in October 2007, they had hoped to conclude 
negotiations by the end of 2008: fighting ACTA on transparency grounds could thus be 
understood to have delayed treaty negotiations significantly. Jamie Love believes that in the 
medium to long term, ACTA negotiating documents will be out in the open. At that point, 
the battle will only just begin: advocates are now in agreement that they must look towards 
campaigning on the substantive issues ACTA presents.  
Substantive issues: “carve-outs” and contradictions 
Although discussions on where to take a substantive campaign against ACTA are only really 
beginning at EFF, Eddan Katz believes discussions should move beyond how US law might 
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need to be changed in order to comply with provisions in ACTA, and towards the public 
policy interests for foreign trade in a knowledge economy. Jamie Love points out that some 
of the draft proposals will have a substantive effect on little-publicised but prolific US legal 
strategies around compulsory licensing that take advantage of the fact that within the 
TRIPS framework, norms on remedies are much weaker than norms on rights: 
It would frustrate the ability of the United States to have a statutory regime for access 
to author works... which rely upon injunctive support and reasonable damages.  It 
threatens the whole set of areas where you might want to actually implement a 
different solution for copyright owners that involves money going to them, different 
forms of compulsory licensing. 
Love sees other problems around the elimination of patent prosecution safe harbours for 
goods in transit. His suspicions are borne out by a number of recent generic drug seizures 
in Amsterdam: 
One of the shipments was a drug, it was a batch of 60,000 or so [second line Aids 
drugs] that were manufactured in India and shipped via Amsterdam on their way to 
the US Embassy in Nigeria to be picked up by the Clinton Foundation...  
It’s not like drugs being sent to the Clinton Foundation via the US Embassy [can 
reasonably be called] a counterfeit ring... but it flows out of an EU Directive on border 
measures that deals with the rights of patent orders to seize goods in transit 
Accordingly to Love, during the ACTA negotiations the EU was asked to eliminate any 
reference to goods in transit in its Directive on Border Measures. He sees a direct link 
between the Dutch seizures and ongoing ACTA negotiations.  
However, issues such as patent safe harbours are currently absent from civil society 
discourse on the dangers of ACTA. Rather, grassroots voices have focussed on changes to 
border search practice for Western consumers, such as the confiscation of iPods if border 
guards suspect them to contain illicitly downloaded .mp3s (this message was initially 
spread in the Canadian press) and the global roll-out of graduated response-style solutions 
to online copyright infringement, with consequential invasion of privacy and threats to 
network neutrality.  
This messaging has transferred to the media. A June 2008 report on ACTA in Ars Technica is 
one good example: 
That might be less important when trade deals are really of concern only to specific 
industries, but the internet, it's fair to say, has broader applications than swapping 
copyrighted songs. Is it really too much ask that the billions of users this might affect 
get a say in the treaty before it emerges full-grown into the light of day? 
But the fear is that what works to mobilise the grassroots may not play so well in the inside 
track. As Jamie Love observes: 
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Suppose that Parliament members think that the ACTA agreement is all about 
stopping illegal filesharing.  If you take a vote among governments whether that’s a 
good thing or a bad thing, most governments will say let’s stop illegal filesharing.  I 
mean actually, you’re doing yourself strategic misfortune because you may be pleasing 
some people at the grassroots, but you may be persuading governments that they 
should pass the ACTA. 
The challenge for advocates now, then, is to conduct a substantive campaign that takes all 
the issues into account, and to find messaging that will work at the grassroots level to 
mobilise support without prejudicing opinions at the negotiating table. 
Strategies 
Both EFF and KEI emphasise their 
preference for a coalition 
approach. Different organisations 
bring different qualities to a 
campaign, and where KEI is well-
known on the inside track for 
producing accurate and reliable 
briefs and policy positions, it 
relies on organisations with 
greater public-facing operations 
to mobilise grassroots support 
and attract media attention, and 
will actively seek coalitions with 
such groups, both from within the 
IP reform community (EFF) and 
further afield (Médecins Sans 
Frontiers). 
Emphasis is also put on 
communicating the potential consequences of new legislation to powerful global 
companies. One effective strategy employed by KEI during debate around the 2005 Hague 
Conference’s Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters was to ask key industry representatives to realise that they had complex interests 
when it came to IP, and to get them to imagine themselves not as plaintiffs, but as 
defendants in IP enforcement cases: 
We said to Sony Pictures, you’re extending this to sui generis regimes, do you realise 
you might get sued for violating folklore rights?  Well, true enough, the guy we were 
talking to had in fact been through one of those suits in a Central American litigation 
and it dawned on him that there was a whole area of liability that they hadn’t looked 
at...and they actually changed their position on key factors of the Treaty. 
Lessons from the campaign against ACTA 
Watch your messaging. When campaigning against 
complex legal instruments, make sure the messages 
you're playing to the grassroots don't compromise 
the arguments you want to make on the inside 
track. 
Use the tools of democracy. Citizens have a right 
to observe and influence the legislative process. 
Demand transparency and use whatever statutory 
provisions there are in your jurisdiction to pursue 
it. 
Let each organisation play to their strength. If 
your organisation does not have a big public 
presence, work with one that does. 
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Although the substantive campaign on ACTA is only just beginning, no advocate 
interviewed regretted the focus on transparency as an initial strategy. Indeed, the external 
factor of a new administration in the US had made that strategy all the more powerful. The 
FOIA lawsuit offers the new administration a chance to put substance behind its rhetoric of 
change: whether or not they take up this opportunity is guaranteed to play well in the 
media, ensuring sustained media interest in ACTA as an issue. 
But regardless of whether such external factors are at play, David Sobel recommends taking 
up the transparency tool: 
It tends to be the case that the more controversial government initiatives, the ones 
that are subject to being the target of a critical campaign, those initiatives tend to be 
the least transparent, meaning that the government  is looking for as little attention 
as possible and is usually not willing to be very forthcoming... So I think it’s always 
very valuable to demand transparency even when you anticipate that that request is 
likely to be denied, because then the denial becomes another point of opposition to the 
initiative.  But if you don’t...formally make the request for the information, then you’re 
not really able to say that it’s been denied. 
Further resources 
http://www.eff.org/ 
http://www.keionline.org  
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3786/99999/ (international ACTA timeline) 
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Conclusion 
 
his report has looked at six successful IP reform campaigns from around the world, 
and examined the strategies, messages and goals of the campaigners who fought 
them. Although each example has its own lessons to share, broad trends have 
emerged. 
Several of the most striking campaign successes employed the internet as a mobilising 
force. A template for such action emerges from examining these campaigns in concert. 
Almost without exception, campaigners worked in coalition with other stakeholders. These 
coalitions varied both in style and in substance, and examining those differences is 
instructive. The campaigns were fought on intellectual and emotional ground which was 
often some distance from the mechanism of intellectual property law itself. This 
observation should encourage campaigners to think about the merits and pitfalls of 
different messaging approaches. Finally, the observation that very few of the case studies 
emerge from countries in the developing world prompts the report to examine why this 
might be so, and to challenge campaigners to examine the value of a more global 
perspective. 
It’s fair to say that the issues that motivate IP reform activists go beyond the public 
messages their campaigns focussed upon. The upcoming campaign against the substantive 
issues contained in the plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement offers 
campaigners an opportunity to find and voice these concerns, concerns that have motivated 
them thus far to undertake the significant an impressive policy interventions in the global 
intellectual property space that have been detailed in this report. The time has come to for a 
mobilising critique against the flawed orthodoxy of tough, unwieldy global intellectual 
property regimes. 
Over the coming years, we can expect new groups to emerge and strengthen in countries 
not covered by this research. Hopefully, this report will help them on their way, and 
provide tools that will be of use to all campaigners who fight intellectual property laws that 
do not serve the needs of citizens in the networked, digital world. 
 
T 
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